When Germany's Daimler Benz merged with the third of America's big three car makers, Chrysler, in 1998 the deal was designed to create an automotive powerhouse, capable of matching the international reach of General Motors and Ford and confronting the emerging challenge from Japan.
"This is the beginning of the number-one transport company in the world," Robert Eaton, the Chrysler executive who became co-chairman of the combined entity, boasted eight years ago. Last week, as the group called in investment bankers to look at the options for the future of Chrysler, including a possible break-up, hubris had turned to humble pie.
Although the company refuses to confirm the appointment of the investment bank JP Morgan, even the prospect that Daimler and Chrysler could divorce has sent Daimler's shares to a six-year high and the Dax index close to a record 7000 points. Investors considering the benefits of corporate divorce need look no further down the autobahn from Stuttgart than Munich. In 2000, BMW called time on its troubled ownership of Britain's Rover. Since then it has scarcely looked back. Sales and profits have soared. The Bavarian car maker is expected to report record profits for 2006 of €4bn (£2.6bn). And Chrysler, which makes 2.7m vehicles a year, is Rover times seven.
The key question, though, is whether last week's announcement really was an early warning that for sale signs were going up or whether it was a ploy to put pressure on the US trade union, the United Auto Workers.
The company is in talks with the union over the Chrysler pension fund deficit and its liabilities towards employees' future healthcare costs. DaimlerChrysler refuses to put a figure on how much they add up to until publication of the annual report but estimates suggest $45bn to $50bn (£26bn).
Ford and General Motors have struck deals with the union to confront similar issues, but Chrysler has yet to do so. The group admits that if it could get a deal along the lines of those negotiated by GM and Ford it would save between $300m and $400m a year. The union may be calculating that DaimlerChrysler has deeper pockets than GM and Ford. If so Stuttgart's decision to parade potential alternatives may be aimed at encouraging second thoughts.
The motor industry rumour mill has already churned out a string of names of possible buyers. General Motors, itself going through a painful recovery, Korea's Hyundai and the two main French groups, Renault-Nissan and Peugeot-Citroën. Hard-headed private equity groups, which supposedly own 15% of Daimler, have been put into the frame. GM, with its position as global number-one car maker under threat from Toyota, might be tempted, but has plenty to keep management occupied. The head of the works council at Opel, its German arm, has few doubts about the impact of a deal, claiming the acquisition of Chrysler would be "an absolute disaster".
The French are cited in German reports as the most interested parties, as buyers or partners. Carlos Ghosn, boss of Renault and its Japanese arm, Nissan, has held abortive talks on an alliance with GM and with Ford. He is in the midst of extensive restructuring and is viewed most favourably because of his cost-cutting record. Henning Gebhardt, head of equities at DWS, Germany's biggest fund-manager, said it would be logical for him to get closer to Chrysler.
Renault and PSA Peugeot-Citroën, now headed by Christian Streiff, who is planning his own rationalisation scheme, are keen to re-establish a US footprint and are said by Der Spiegel to have held secret talks with the Daimler board. They could use spare Chrysler capacity to build their own smaller, more eco-friendly cars in the US and take over its dealer network while the American manufacturer could use their platforms to produce its own fuel-efficient vehicles - away from the gas-guzzling giants that brought it down.
Mr Ghosn and Mr Streiff, however, have busy agendas without Chrysler. Any trade buyer would also have to ask itself how much extra production capacity it wanted at a time when the industry, arguably, has too much, especially in a high-cost area such as the US.
Even if JP Morgan can whip up enthusiasm for Chrysler, what sort of price could it command? Chrysler was worth $35bn (£18bn) at the time of the 1998 merger. Today that looks a very distant prospect. Some analysts put it as low as €5bn, taking into account the pension and healthcare liabilities, while others put it at €10bn and yet others at up to €17bn. Either way, Chrysler is said to need a capital injection of at least €10bn and maybe as much as €17bn to help cover its healthcare and pension holes - money which Daimler doesn't have, despite raising €10bn in disposals and spin-offs in the last seven years.
German investors are, however, united in their belief that a stand-alone Daimler, with its resurgent Mercedes brand, would soar in value. The combined group is now quoted at about €56 a share but, on its own, Daimler would be worth up to €75, traders said, suggesting its return on capital would return to the 15% pre-merger level and return on sales to 7%.
This would free up DaimlerChrysler's chief executive, Dieter Zetsche, who ran Chrysler for much of the first half of the decade, to increase investment in Mercedes closer to BMW levels.
But why is Daimler's global ambition threatening to end on a sour note? It was never a marriage made in heaven. Stuttgart and Michigan are separated by more than the Atlantic. The ink was scarcely dry on the deal before Daimler got a sharp reminder of the difference between Rhineland capitalism and the US version, altogether more red in tooth and claw.
Kirk Kerkorian, one of Chrysler's leading shareholders, and a failed bidder, sued the German group arguing that the deal was a takeover, not a merger, so Daimler should have paid a premium for control. More to the point, Daimler and Chrysler have struggled to make the deal equal, let alone exceed, the sum of the parts.
Last week's announcement of a strategic review - including the loss of 13,000 US jobs and a production reduction of 400,000 vehicles a year - is designed to tackle two problems. Those are Chrysler's over reliance on the North American market, which accounts for 90% of its sales, and the need to revamp the product line-up, reducing the dependence on sports-utility vehicles and trucks in favour of the more fuel-efficient models increasingly in vogue.
"We must make some strategic adjustments to build off our historic strengths, but not rely on them so much that we are put at a competitive disadvantage," according to Chrysler president and chief executive, Tom LaSorda.
The snag for Chrysler is that Stuttgart may decide its historic strength is the Mercedes brand and the strategic adjustment is the disposal of the US business.
